NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE THEOLOGIE UND RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE

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SONDERDRUCK
Nicht im Handel
Frankfort and Religious Symbols*

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Many a theologian and/or philosopher is acquainted with or has at least heard of the book with the suggestive title Before Philosophy, which since 1949 has been available in large editions and many reprints. This well-known Pelican book is a shortened edition of a series of lectures originally published under the title which was afterwards to serve as the subtitle of Before Philosophy: The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man, that appeared in 1946. Before Philosophy was translated into several languages, including German (1954 A). These titles not only invite philosophers to take a step backwards, but also ask for the attention of anthropologists, archaeologists, orientalists, students of the Old Testament, religious historians and others interested in the humanities. In this book John Wilson described the outlook upon the world, upon the state and upon life in general in Ancient Egypt and Thorkild Jacobsen did the same for Mesopotamia. These two “essays” were introduced and concluded by two papers by Henri Frankfort and Mrs. H. A. Frankfort-Groenewegen on “Myth and Reality” and “The Emancipation of Thought from Myth”.

Note the date and place of publication: This much-read volume was written almost forty years ago in Chicago, immediately after the end of the Second World War. A quarter of a century later the prominent egyptologist John Wilson wrote about this in his autobiography (Wilson, 1972: 136): “Of all the writings I take most pride in [are] my chapters in the volume that resulted from the series of lectures on the ideas of ancient man ... I had just returned from the war years in Washington and found that I could look at my field afresh. Frankfort's original analysis of ancient psychology ignited us all and we were emboldened to try to understand more clearly.”

Before going into what Frankfort writes in Before Philosophy about religious symbols in particular, it may be important to relate who this inspiring Henri Frankfort was.

There was a time, especially in the fifties, that the name Frankfort itself was almost a symbol of insight into the mentality of the pre-western, pre-classical cultures of the Ancient Near East. The historian and archaeologist Frankfort always included Egypt under the term Ancient Near East. In several of his larger and smaller publications the duality of the two great

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cultural centres Egypt and Mesopotamia is elaborated. According to him these two great centres influenced the other ‘peripheral’ cultures of Syria, Asia Minor and Persia. The Ancient Near East as such “occupies a distinct position between the universal barbarism of prehistory and classical antiquity” (Frankfort, 1952 A: 193). In this ensemble the Hebrew culture (Frankfort always speaks of Hebrew and not of Israelitish) that originated in a “backwater” has a special place because of its transcendent conception of god, different from that found elsewhere in the Ancient Near East, where god was “immanent in nature”. Not only historically, but also philosophically the Ancient Near East is important, because “the birth of civilization” took place there. Such a birth has taken place in other instances, but then always, China included, through contact with more advanced foreigners, while the origin of the Maya and Inca civilizations still remains wrapped in obscurity (Frankfort, 1951: 15).

Around 1950 whole libraries had already been filled by orientalists and others in the course of more than a century with excavation reports, texts published in literal or critical editions and translations and other oriental studies. There were already enough aids, grammars, dictionaries and other summaries for one to take an enthusiastic plunge into the study of the ancient near eastern world. If one did so, however, choosing it as main or minor subject, one was soon so hopelessly snowed under by philological, archaeological and historical details that one felt totally lost. Anyone in the fifties who wanted to find out what he was really doing, received guidance from his professor — there were then practically no other instructors at Dutch universities except a few assistants — or took up one of Frankfort’s books, for Frankfort provided insight and ideas. That was not only in Before Philosophy, but also in some of his less specialized, less technical books than his excavation reports, such as Ancient Egyptian Religion (1948), translated into Dutch under the rather more apt title of De Levensopvatting der Oude Egyptenaren (1951), the more extensive Kingship and the Gods (1948) or The Birth of Civilization in the Near East (1951). Usually these books were also translated into other languages sooner or later. The many brilliant lectures, which appeared as articles in journals or as brochures are too numerous to be summed up. The bibliography of Frankfort (Vindelas, 1955: 4—13) comprises, leaving aside some articles that appeared posthumously and later translations, 15 books, contributions to 20 books (mainly excavation reports) 73 articles and many book reviews.

Frankfort (1897—1954) was not one who had from an early age turned his attention to the intellectual adventures of ancient eastern man and his religious symbols that integrated him in culture and nature, such as divine kingship. He began as a “field-archaeologist”, learning the craft from the famous archaeologist Flinders Petrie in Egypt in 1922—1924. Moreover he journeyed extensively through the Near East in those years. In 1924—1925 he was a “student of the British School” this he conducted excavations of the Egypt (1925—1929) and of the On Chicago in Mesopotamia (1929—1933), historian and archaeologist at the university in Leiden, where he obtained his doctorate. As those immersed in the humanities! in Early Pottery of the Near East, he dating from after the Second World War the originality and wide outlook of the studies in the Netherlands which were usually not apply so much to Van der Lee, translated into German, French and of the Phenomenologie der Religiosity contribution of Kristensen, whose to the Netherlands but was drawn Kristensen’s successor in Leiden, and utilized. Personal contacts with the studies at Dutch universities. In 1933 Mesopotamia during the winter season of archaeology and the Near East at the University of Chicago.

From 1937—1949, when the war which made its influence felt upon the racialism and afterwards war, Frankfort made its influence felt upon the racialism and afterwards war, Frankfort was professor” at the Oriental Institute. He worked on the definitive reports to devote time and energy to poorer motivated ancient eastern man who other remains of material culture that he (1939), a still important book, is a religious iconography and symbolism description and classification in the volumes on the excavations he directed in the Near East, East, East, and the Warburg and Courtauld Institute, University of London. Among the works mentioned, The Art and Architecture regarded as his masterpiece. The also to appear in the Pelican Histor his sudden and premature death at th
he was a “student of the British School of Archaeology” in Athens. After this he conducted excavations of the English Egypt Exploration Society in Egypt (1925—1929) and of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago in Mesopotamia (1929—1937). He received university education as historian and archaeologist at the universities of Amsterdam, London and Leiden, where he obtained his doctoral degree with the dissertation Studies in Early Pottery of the Near East. A beginning that is hardly legible for those immersed in the humanities! Not until later publications, mainly dating from after the Second World War, does it become evident how much the originality and wide outlook of Frankfort, noticed by many, was also nourished by the studies in religious history and orientalistics in the Netherlands which were usually published in Dutch. This last remark does not apply so much to Van der Leeuw, whose work was at least in part translated into German, French and English and to whose English edition of the Phenomenologie der Religie Frankfort could refer. It was the contribution of Kristensen, whose teaching was not so well known outside the Netherlands but was drawn upon by Van der Leeuw and De Buck, Kristensen’s successor in Leiden, and by others whose work Frankfort later utilized. Personal contacts with the Netherlands also remained after his studies at Dutch universities. In 1933, that is while he was still digging in Mesopotamia during the winter season, he became professor extraordinary of archaeology and the Near East at the University of Amsterdam.

From 1937—1949, when the world was ravaged by the economic crisis which made its influence felt upon the costly excavation campaigns, and by racialism and afterwards war, Frankfort resided at Chicago as “research professor” at the Oriental Institute. Till long after the Second World War he worked on the definitive reports of his excavations, and he was now able to devote time and energy to pondering the question of what had really motivated ancient eastern man who had made all those pots and pans and other remains of material culture that he had dug up. In his Cylinders Seals (1939), a still important book, it is already evident how fascinated he was by religious iconography and symbolism, although in that volume technical description and classification inevitably took first place. The imposing volumes on the excavations he directed in Egypt and especially in Mesopotamia have given Frankfort a permanent place in his particular fields. Apart from his work as an archaeologist, he exerted an influence through lectures, articles and books, particularly since the Second World War until his death in 1954, after leaving Chicago in 1949 to become the director of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes in London and professor at the University of London. Among art historians a book we have not yet mentioned, The Art and Architecture of the Ancient Near East (1954 B), is regarded as his masterpiece. The companion volume on Egypt, that was also to appear in the Pelican History of Art, remained unwritten owing to his sudden and premature death at the age of 57. While beginning as a field-
archaeologist, he must have been a brilliant lecturer; at any rate it is a literary delight to read his writings: "Born a Dutchman, of Jewish extraction, he was an excellent linguist, who yet commanded a finer English style than many born English can hope to do" (Barnett, 1954: 353).

So far the influence upon Frankfort of religious historians and orientalists of the Netherlands has been indicated, and also the reciprocal influence of Frankfort upon the practice of these sciences at Dutch universities in the fifties, perhaps more pronounced than elsewhere. This influence had already begun before the Second World War. As already remarked, he had a pied-à-terre in Amsterdam and occasionally published in Dutch. Later he became a corresponding member of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences. The special interest taken in the Netherlands, for example, in the Egyptian god Osiris and the pharaoh Echnaton is all the more comprehensible when one knows that it was Frankfort who in the twenties directed excavations in Egypt in Abydos, the town of Osiris, and in Amarna, the town of Echnaton. In the first part of the 20th century German oriental studies and science of religion had mainly formed the background in the Netherlands; until the time of the Nazis it had indeed been very common to study for one or more semesters in Germany before taking a doctoral degree — Frankfort, who did post-graduate studies in London, formed an exception to this rule. After the isolation of the Second World War, however, American publications were eagerly perused. The time when all that Europeans knew about Chicago was that pigs were slaughtered there in a hypermodern manner on a conveyorbelt was long past. The Oriental Institute, founded in the twenties with money from Rockefeller and in the thirties and forties also nourished by European brain-drain, produced a rich harvest both before and after the Second World War.

If I am to evaluate the present-day appreciation of Frankfort in a part of the field he worked in and that I can to some extent survey, i.e. in Egyptology, it must be said that Frankfort is thought to be out-of-date. It would indeed be a bad thing for the progress of egyptological sciences if that were not the case, even though in this small field of Egyptology there are only estimated to be about 600 "working egyptologists". Yet as one of the old giants Frankfort is still fairly regularly quoted, with or without approval. He is not forgotten. French egyptologists soon pointed out some one-sided view of Frankfort: Garnot and especially Posener. German egyptologists of a more philological inclination had difficulty with Frankfort from the beginning, just as Frankfort on his part could not agree with Erman, Schäfer, Sethe, Kees and their followers. The present-day leading German specialists in the field of Egyptian religion prove to be still very well acquainted with Frankfort and to have undergone his influence. One would almost think of a closing circle here: German science of religion and orientalistics → the Netherlands → Frankfort → Germany.

In the English/American speech always been less interest in science of religion. The English egyptologist and the anthropological approach of Frankfort returned to the historical and historical school of Sethe, Kees, a.o. However, the Comparative Study of Early C extensively quoting Frankfort as on research useful to his purpose, partially.

Frankfort was indeed not men Netherlands religio-historical school in the very first place, a pupil of the ar interested in anthropology. In his Art defined archaeology as the science antiquity in their mutual coherence* and the Netherlands of Frankfort's much concentrated upon philology, in their time. Philologists interpret texts, archaeologists attempt, by means of the culture in which the texts or unlike many other egyptologists Frankfort meaning of the texts in order to form use to religious historians. Thus he got in Egypt as follows: "Amun of Theb, Khonsu, went from the main shrine of miles upstream. In saying that these texts because we do not know exactly To put the problem in this way may gists, but it was, and perhaps somet who, just like classical philologists o texts. It is just because Frankfort stan level than that of the texts, and work serviceable to anthropological is to grasp the full meaning of the te studying religious history, also in the two ways to penetrate behind the there are alive today in Africa group that great East African substratum. Among other things we can study thinkings affects both the ruler and hi correction, for we are dealing here w inertia, have preserved through su
In the English/American speaking region there has traditionally always been less interest in science of religion and thus also in Egyptian religion. The English Egyptologist and classicist Gwyn Griffiths opposed the anthropological approach of Frankfort to Egyptian mythology and returned to the historical and historifying interpretation of the German school of Sethe, Kees, a.o. However, Frankfort’s anthropological contribution was more appreciated there. Thus Trigger wrote about Egypt and the Comparative Study of Early Civilizations (Trigger, 1979, 23—56), extensively quoting Frankfort as one of the few writers who had done research useful to his purpose, particularly concerning sacred kingship.

Frankfort was indeed not merely a product and transmitter of the Netherlands religio-historical school of Kristensen. He was also, and in the very first place, a pupil of the archaeologist Flinders Petrie, who was interested in anthropology. In his Amsterdam oration of 1933 Frankfort defined archaeology as the science devoted to “the material remains of antiquity in their mutual coherence”. The religious historians of Germany and the Netherlands of Frankfort’s generation and earlier were still very much concentrated upon philology, like the theologians and classicists of their time. Philologists interpret texts and often leave it at that, whereas archaeologists attempt, by means of the material remains, to form a picture of the culture in which the texts originated. It is interesting to note that unlike many other Egyptologists Frankfort really tries to get at the full meaning of the texts in order to form a more comprehensive picture of real use to religious historians. Thus he gives a description of a religious festival in Egypt as follows: “Amun of Thebes with the goddess Mut and their son Khonsu, went from the main shrine of Karnak to the temple at Luxor, two miles upstream. In saying that these gods went, I speak the language of the texts because we do not know exactly what did go.” (Frankfort, 1952 B:7).

To put the problem in this way may be a matter of course for anthropologists, but it was, and perhaps sometimes still is, unheard of for orientalists who, just like classical philologists or biblical scholars, want to keep to the texts. It is just because Frankfort strove to give a description upon another level than that of the texts, and succeeded in doing so, that he made his work serviceable to anthropological and comparative research. This striving to grasp the full meaning of the texts is a methodical principle for him in studying religious history, also in the matter of sacred kingship: “There are two ways to penetrate behind the words of our texts. In the first place, there are alive today in Africa groups of people who are true survivors of that great East African substratum out of which Egyptian culture arose. Among other things we can study there how deeply the divine nature of the kings affects both the ruler and his subjects. Yet this evidence requires correction, for we are dealing here with savages who, either by tenacity or by inertia, have preserved through several thousand years the remnants of a primeval world of thought, while Pharaonic culture was the most highly
developed and most progressive of its age. The other road to a more direct and vivid understanding of ancient thought approaches it, not in its conceptual, but in its pictorial or plastic, expression. Art is expression in form, a direct expression directly grasped by the spectator.” (Frankfort, 1948 A: 6).

This idea of Frankfort that “art is ... directly grasped by the spectator” has of course been disputed. He does not mean however to leave the door wide open here for those unburdened by knowledge of the matter who will blithely let loose their intuition. It may be worth-while to state how Frankfort accepts intuition in scientific work: “... only long and thorough familiarity with the sources creates the peculiar climate in which Clio may grant us her incomparable gift, intuitive insight, the recognition of a viewpoint whence seemingly unrelated facts are seen to acquire meaning and coherence” (Frankfort, 1952 A: 200). This does not do away with the methodic objection that it cannot be checked which may be raised against having recourse to intuition in scientific work. In Frankfort's generation, however, intuition as a methodic principle was still accepted with unconcern, as one may observe in reading for instance Kristensen or Panowski.

Although in his research Frankfort usually confines himself to the historical entity of the Ancient Near East, he introduces the “savages” in the quotation given above. Here actually only as living informants for his hypothesis of the so-called African substratum of divine kingship in accordance with B.Z. and C.G. Seligman. Later research could not confirm his Hamitic hypothesis. It is painful to have to recognize that Frankfort who was so careful in handling ethnological data, much more careful than Van der Leeuw, here fell a victim to “yet another racist fantasy of the early twentieth century” (Trigger, 1979: 25 cf. MacGaffey, 1966: 1—17 and also Vercooutter, 1978, 15—26).

Frankfort was far too much an historian and archaeologist of his time simply to advance anthropological data as an explanation. In discussion with Frazer he remarks: “if we assume that the same motives have operated universally, if we assume that ‘specifically different’ phenomena are ‘generically alike’ we bar ourselves from a true understanding of the religious experience of antiquity by interpreting abstractions” (Frankfort, 1958 A: 143).

Occasionally, for instance in order to understand the significance of the cow in the Egyptian religion, he points out that study of primitive cultures can “open our eyes to possibilities which our own experience could never have suggested” (Frankfort, 1948 A: 163). So cultural anthropology has a certain use as general development for the orientalist. Yet when in his treatment of Egyptian kingship he quotes data about African rain-making kings he waringly adds what are really functionalistic objections: “since the significance of each of these can be estimated only when the cultural context in which they belong is known then they solve ...” (Frankfort, 1948 B: 4). He then quotes a return had borrowed from anthropologists among African negroes have picked up a style which, though not regarded as a good Van Baaren afterwards pointed out the interpretation given by Van der Lijn mistaken (Van der Leeuw: 19). Van Baaren does not quite know how to place the end dryly remarks: “It appears that sometimes in a curiously accidental and which remain unresolved, he always to be possible to make the long “We should do well to retain from one certain scepticism as to the value of it goes back to Egypt, the goddess Isis those objects with “a deeper, a truly 1948 B: 6).

As a historian of the Ancient Near East equated with pre-classical antiquity reserve in using the data of cultural his time studied classical antiquity for and study texts, places and objects edge regarding Ancient Egypt was, a the ultimate aim of Egyptology, and compare methods regarding the culture of Egypt Near East, which though related did remained within the spatial and temporal He was careful with data from primitive of historical ground under his feet.

Therefore he was also careful of Jung: “It is also an an-historical must less” because Jung’s statements are of a reproach, since Jung explored
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context in which they belong is known they pose many more questions than they solve …” (Frankfort, 1948 A: 354 n. 18). Frankfort hardly dared to work with data from primitive religions because there he could not be certain of striking the right note by intuition, that is the aforesaid “long and thorough familiarity of the sources”.

In another instance he is less reserved because there — quite without justification as was afterwards shown, he trusted Van der Leeuw. In a treatise on Egyptian gods he writes “Here, we may well use the evidence collected by anthropologists among living believers in polytheism” (Frankfort, 1948 B: 4). He then quotes a few examples that Van der Leeuw in his turn had borrowed from anthropologists: There have been instances when African negroes have picked up a stone or a piece of iron from the ground which, though not regarded as a god, was yet considered to be powerful. Van Baaren afterwards pointed out that precisely these examples with their interpretation given by Van der Leeuw are extremely questionable and mistaken (Van der Leeuw: 19; Van Baaren, 1956—1957: 332). Frankfort does not quite know how to place these examples “by intuition”, and in the end dryly remarks: “It appears that superhuman powers reveal themselves sometimes in a curiously accidental manner”. From the questions he raises and which remain unresolved, he concludes that one cannot expect it to always be possible to make the Egyptian material transparently clear. “We should do well to retain from our excursion among modern savages a certain scepticism as to the value of symbols …” whereupon he quickly goes back to Egypt, the goddess Isis and her hieroglyph the throne, one of those objects with “a deeper, a truly symbolical significance” (Frankfort, 1948 B: 6).

As a historian of the Ancient Near East, which in his time was more or less equated with pre-classical antiquity, Frankfort maintained a certain reserve in using the data of cultural anthropology. Just as the classicists of his time studied classical antiquity for its own sake, so egyptologists studied and study texts, places and objects of art as an end in themselves. Knowledge regarding Ancient Egypt was, and for many egyptologists still is, the ultimate aim of egyptology, and contributing to an explanation of man and his behaviour is hardly seen as an actual objective. Since Frankfort could not only survey the culture of Egypt but also other cultures of the Ancient Near East, which though related did not have a common historical basis, he came to apply comparative methods in various books and articles, but he remained within the spatial and temporal frame of the Ancient Near East. He was careful with data from primitive cultures, for there he felt the lack of historical ground under his feet.

Therefore he was also careful with the psycho-analytical explanations of Jung: “It is also an an-historical more or less scientific [view] — “more or less” because Jung’s statements are often contradictory. This is not meant as a reproach, since Jung explores untrdden ground” (Frankfort,
1958 B: 168). “Jung’s overestimation of the importance of motives of individual psychology for the growth and efficacy of the myths has had fatal results. It leads him to misunderstand completely the historical life of symbols. It can be accepted that mythological conceptions arise from the unconscious; it is true that they are not contrived and sophisticated allegories. They are in the first instance spontaneously invented and owe their existence to an inspiration, a vision or to the authority of a revelation. But this first stage of a symbol, its original appearance, does not necessarily determine its meaning at later stages of the cultural development. Once it exists the form in which it was cast acquires its own peculiar life and power of resistance; its fate cannot be foretold from its first significance” (Frankfort, 1958 B: 177).

In the discussion with Jung Frankfort wants to take religious conceptions literally and not reduce them “symbolically” to something different. Here one may think of the present-day controversy between symbolists (Douglas, 1970) and intellectualists (Horton, 1967; 1982) … “for primitive and ancient peoples re-birth was no symbol at all, but the reality to which they aspired. In Egypt this future event was thought of as a return to the mother. The dead, as Osiris, was united with his mother Nut, the sky-goddess, by being laid in the coffin with which she is identified, as if he were laid within her body. He will be reborn by her. There is no question of spiritual transformation …” (Frankfort, 1958 B: 176—177). And he even pointedly remarks: “The significance of mythological images lies in their manifest contents; they do not express the repressed, unadmitted or compensatory contents of the unconscious” (Frankfort, 1958 B: 178).

Yet Frankfort was far more open to anthropological and psychoanalytical explanations than most of the other orientalists of his day, who in their own field straightaway refused all discussion with these methods and data. Once we even see Frankfort talk about in the discussion between symbolists and intellectualists. Sometimes there is “complete agreement between Egyptological and psychoanalytical material … the motive of incest which plays so great a part in subconscious symbolism is by no means to be taken in the literal sense (as was often done by the Freudian school), but serves often as an image of the desire for immortality” (Frankfort, 1948 A: 387 n. 81). One cannot avoid the impression, however, that Frankfort’s view of this matter was in part influenced by modern conscious or unconscious considerations of morality. It is sometimes touching to see how Egyptologists try to clear princes and pharaohs of incestuous blame or try to minimalize homosexuality in Egyptian mythology to a non-religious episode or a later variant.

It would take us too far finally to attempt to give a systematic synopsis here of Frankfort’s article ‘Myth and Reality’ in Before Philosophy and to discuss it. One must read or reread oneself to get the flavour of it.

Frankfort points out that the outlook upon nature in cultures of the Ancient Near East and in primitive cultures is in the final article ‘The Emancipation of Thought’ in his book The Dawn of European Culture. He claims that the Greek nature. The God of the psalmists and transcendent, whereas the gods of Egypt was immanent in nature. Now in more recent researches we sometimes find the term transcendent in the Old Testament. However, one immanence. Whether the differences in cultures and times are really made mutually exclusive by means of the philosophical abstractness of the human psyche. Frankfort has pointed out that in the Egyptian psyche, but also in the cult and myth of the gods. 25—28; 76—77) also paid special, not only the cosmic dimension of the Egyptian gods, but also the cult and myth of the gods. Hence he constructed a model that closely follows the Hebrew and the Egyptian conception of their respective gods.

Besides having several functions, the Egyptian conception of God is not only the cosmic dimension of the Egyptian gods, but also the cult and myth of the gods. Hence he constructed a model that closely follows the Hebrew and the Egyptian conception of their respective gods.

A more questionable abstraction is the conception of the “mentalité prélogique” and the “pre-mythopoietic” mindset. While Van der Leeuw appreciated its own inherent logic between modern and mythopoetic thought, Frankfort thought beyond our understanding and adapt ourselves to its concept (e.g., 362 n. 4). Here Frankfort proves to have accepted him! Even though Frankfort’s prehistorical mentality, yet Frankfort does not.
Frankfort wants to take religious conceptions "symbolically" to something different. The controversy between symbolists (Horton, 1967; 1982) ... "for primitive symbol at all, but the reality to which it points is thought of as a return to the sources of the human spirit. The sky god Nut, the human Nut, the sky goddess which she is identified, as if she were born by her. There is no question of fact, 1957 B: 176—177). And he even speaks of mythological images lies in their repressed, unadmitted or unconscious" (Frankfort, 1958 B: 178).

When we laterally and psychoanalytically orientalists of his day, who in his discussion with these methods and think about it in the discussion between emphasized there is "complete agreement between analytical material ... the motive of unconscious symbolism is by no means as was often done by the Freudian age of the desire for immortality." cannot avoid the impression, however, that he was in part influenced by modern assumptions of morality. It is sometimes very to clear princesses and pharaohs of the homosexuality in Egyptian mythological variant.

An attempt to give a systematic synopsis of "Reality" in Before Philosophy and to pass oneself to get the flavour of it. Outlook upon nature in cultures of the Ancient Near East and in primitive cultures is different from ours. In the final article 'The Emancipation of Thought from Myth' he shows that the Hebrews and subsequently the Greeks broke with this way of regarding nature. The God of the psalmists and prophets was not in nature, he was transcendent, whereas the gods of Egypt and Mesopotamia were conceived as immanent in nature. Now in more recent studies of the Egyptian religion we sometimes find the term transcendency emphatically used in describing Egyptian conceptions of the gods: Morenz (1964); Assmann (1983). On the other hand Hornung (1971) considers that this term cannot be applied. And in the Old Testament inversely one can also find examples of divine immanence. Whether the differences in the conception of nature in different cultures and times are really made sufficiently intelligible in such a rigorous scheme of either I — Thou or I — It would require constant checking in further research. Just how matters stood in Egypt with regard to what are still always called personifications, I really cannot quite satisfactorily grasp by means of the philosophical abstraction I — Thou. Assmann (1977:765) has pointed out that in the Egyptian gods one can distinguish not only a cosmic, but also a cultic and a mythical dimension. Frankfort (1948 B: 25—28; 76—77) also paid special, not to say one-sided, attention to the cosmic dimension of the Egyptian gods whom he regarded as "immanent in nature". Hence he constructed a more marked contrast between the Hebrew and the Egyptian conception of their gods than is necessary. Besides having several functions, an Egyptian god is also a person (Derchain, 1979: 43—46).

A more questionable abstraction seems to me Frankfort’s term mythopoetic thought or myth-making thinking. This is Frankfort’s translation of the "mentalité prélogique" and the "primitive mentality" of Levy-Bruhl and Van der Leeuw respectively, whose names figure in the suggested readings at the end of the article. Elsewhere Frankfort writes: "A somewhat prolonged familiarity with the pre-Greek mind makes it possible for one to appreciate its own inherent logic ... Levy-Bruhl defined the difference between modern and mythopoetic thought clearly, but he went too far. When we speak occasionally of “pre-Greek” or primitive — instead of mythopoetic — thought we do not mean to suggest that the Egyptians and Mesopotamians must be viewed as modern savages or that the mythmaking tendencies died with the Greeks ... however irrational modern man may be in reasoning or reactions, he nevertheless attaches authority to “scientific” thought alone. It is the absence of this norm which puts primitive and pre-Greek thought beyond our understanding unless we allow for the difference and adapt ourselves to its consequences” (Frankfort, 1948 A: 63 and 362 n. 4). Here Frankfort proves to have read Van der Leeuw very well and to have accepted him! Even though mythopoetic thought is a mitigated prelogical mentality, yet Frankfort draws no slight practical conclusions from this abstraction: There would not have been our contrast between
seeming and substance, our separation between the dead and the living in the Ancient Near East (Frankfort, 1949:20, 21)! This mythopoeic thought, like the primitive mentality of Van der Leeuw, must now be dismissed as superfluous fiction.

Reasoning on in this line Frankfort arrives at his idea of a symbol: "There is coalescence of the symbol and what it signifies" (ibid., 21). The examples taken from the Egyptian religion with which he supported this thesis can be refuted in detail if desired, in so far as the material can be decisive, but that would be superfluous, because the hypothesis of a prelogical mentality is nowadays nowhere accepted.

This theory of the symbol has sometimes decisively determined the results of Frankfort's research. In that still important book Kingship and the Gods Frankfort tried to show that the pharaoh was a god upon earth, that no distinction was made between the symbol and that which it meant, between significant and signifié. Posener, a precise philologist, averse to sweeping theories, has written a whole book (1960) to prove that the Egyptians knew that the pharaoh was only an ordinary man, except that his royalty represented the presence of god and gods, in other words that the Egyptians really could and did make a distinction between the symbol and that which it stands for. This overcharged view of Frankfort that the Egyptians believed the pharaoh to be a god upon earth and that they made no distinction between a symbol and what it signified was determined by a comparison with the Mesopotamian material where the human side of the ruler was more noticeable than in Egypt. Posener's valid criticism affords a good example of a situation wherein a philologist can correct the archaeologist or anthropologist, when for a change it was not the archaeologist — anthropologist, but on the contrary the philologist who found out the meaning of the texts.

Frankfort's emphasis upon the coalescence, that is upon the coinciding (symballein!) of the symbol and what it means is hardly acceptable to those who by the word 'symbol' mean a sign referring to something else or a sign that, with means taken from this reality, gives expression to a reality of a different order. Yet we must, with Frankfort, hold on to the connection between the symbol and reality, even where, as here, it concerns the divinity and the humanity of the Egyptian pharaoh. In a theological publication such as this one may remind the reader of the discussion in the Old Church concerning the human and the divine nature of the symbol Jesus Christ. The Council of Chalcedon formulated this in 451 as on the one hand "not commingled and unchanged" and yet "undivided and inseparable". Considering that the meaning of religious symbols has already been discussed for such a very long time, our generation of religious history can hardly claim that our views will be the last word. Although then Frankfort concurred with the symbol theory of Cassirer, Van der Leeuw and others which prevailed in his time, he would also make use of other possibilities in his description of a religious field-archaeologist did not slavishly follow symbol theorists of his generation. His research (e.g. Hornung, 1971:106) is of a new kind, that animal heads are to be explained as evolutionary theory that the hybrid functional forms intermediate between the anthropomorphic gods of a more enlightened era he is embarking upon new ways of seeing. The Egyptians did not intend their hieroglyphs to be imagined reality at all and that we should not take their face value. Their designs were not the same (Frankfort, 1948 B:12). This shows that the Egyptians really could distinguish, and that the god, that is between the symbol and what it signifies.

Frankfort must have seen this and subscribed to elsewhere, or have sensed it, or mentioned "long and thorough familiarity with art and on occasion make the laconic remark" something about a god, sometimes it can be seen then that in spite of the prevailing speaking of symbol when significant and when the symbol seems to be an attempt to define Frankfort "multiplicity of approach" (1950). Useful too in later research, also because of the relationship between the symbol and what it means, and the multiplicity of symbols to it. The multiplicity of approaches to religions confirms the referential nature of the texts.

Frankfort was one who in his time, subject, the bounds of field-archaeology, cultural anthropology, psychology, sociology. And if he did not find there what he looked for, he led lines towards the future, also in the interplay.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG


Frankfort, H. (1933), De Archaelogie en de Geschiedenis van het Nabije Oosten. Rede uitgesproken bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van buitengewoon hoogleraar in de archeologie en de geschiedenis van het Nabije Oosten aan de universiteit van Amsterdam op 23 October 1933, Amsterdam.


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